Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities

On November 26, 2025, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in Washington, D.C., published a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”) entitled “Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities” in the Federal Register (90 FR 54248; GN Docket No. 13-111).  The FCC in this FNPRM is proposing rules that would enhance public safety by removing regulatory barriers to allow existing and developing technologies to combat contraband wireless device use in correctional facilities. In furtherance of this goal, the FCC in this FNPRM seeks comment on a proposed framework to authorize, for the first time, non-federal operation of radio frequency (RF) jamming solutions in correctional facilities, expanding the scope of technical options available to corrections officials facing this threat. The impetus for this FNPRM is the fact that the use of contraband cell phones in correctional facilities has reached epidemic and dangerous proportions. See News Release, Grassley Opens Hearing on Counter-Drone Authorities (May 20, 2025), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/remarks/grassley-opens-hearing-on-counter-drone-authorities (organized crime groups bombard prisons with contraband like dangerous weapons, drugs, cell phones and tools to aid escape).

This epidemic is directly related to the use of drones to deliver contraband to inmates in correctional facilities. See, e.g., Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice, Addressing Contraband in Prisons and Jails as the Threat of Drone Deliveries Grows (June 2, 2023), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/addressing-contraband-prisons-and-jails-threat-drone-deliveries-grows.

The FNPRM established the deadline for submitting comments on or before  December 26, 2025. Approximately 80 comments have been submitted by interested parties through the FCC’s comment portal (ECFS) to date.  Reply comments are due on or before January 12, 2026. 

RESTORING AMERICAN AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY - EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED JUNE 6, 2025 - HIGHLIGHTS, PART THREE

The Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty Executive Order was issued by President Trump on June 6, 2025. See here. The purpose of the Executive Order (EO) was to address the perceived threat offered by Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (“UAS” or “drones”) to potentially endanger public safety through unauthorized drone flights and to ensure American sovereignty over its skies and that its airspace remains safe and secure.

The following is Part Three of a summary of provisions of particular interest with respect to drone law in the EO.

Section 7 of the EO, entitled “Detection, Tracking, and Identification of Drones and Drone Signals”, provides that:

(a)  To the extent permitted by law and consistent with the Fourth Amendment, executive departments and agencies shall use all available existing authorities to employ equipment to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals.

(b)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission shall revise the August 2020 “Advisory on the Application of Federal Laws to the Acquisition and Use of Technology to Detect and Mitigate Unmanned Aircraft Systems” to reflect relevant developments in Federal law and regulations addressing drones.

(c)  Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Administrator of the FAA shall provide, to the extent permitted by law, including the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), automated real-time access to personal identifying information associated with UAS remote identification signals to appropriate executive departments and agencies and SLTT agencies for the purposes of enforcing applicable Federal or State law, with appropriate national security and privacy safeguards.

The revision of the above-referenced Advisory to allow executive departments and agencies to use all available existing authorities to employ equipment to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals, as well as to reflect relevant developments in Federal law and regulations addressing drones,  is necessary for several important reasons.

Background.

On August 17, 2020, The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an advisory guidance document (“August 2020 Advisory”) to assist non-federal public and private entities to better understand the federal laws and regulations that may apply to the use of technical tools, systems, and capabilities to detect and mitigate Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).

The August 2020 Advisory indicates that it is intended to provide an overview of various provisions of the U.S. criminal code enforced by DOJ, as well as federal laws and regulations related to aviation safety and efficiency, transportation and airport security, and the radiofrequency spectrum administered respectively by the FAA, DHS, and FCC. 

Detection Capabilities

The August 2020 Advisory breaks the detection capabilities into two categories, since each category presents a unique set of difficulties from a legal perspective:

1.  Systems that detect, monitor, or track UAS often rely on radio-frequency (RF), radar, electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), or acoustic capabilities, or a combination thereof. These capabilities detect the physical presence of UAS or signals sent to or from the UAS.

2. Detection systems that emit electromagnetic waves or pulses of sound or light that are reflected off an object and back to the detection system—such as radar, EO/IR, and acoustic systems—are less likely to pose concerns under federal criminal surveillance statutes. Such technology senses the sound or electromagnetic waves produced by or reflected from the UAS and does not capture, record, decode, or intercept electronic communications.

The August 2020 Advisory advises caution for the UAS detection systems that detect the physical presence of UAS by intercepting signals sent to or from the UAS.  Specifically, the August 2020 Advisory indicates that systems using RF capabilities to detect and track UAS by monitoring the communications passed between a UAS and its ground control station may implicate two federal statutes, the Pen/Trap Statute and Wiretap Act.

The August 2020 Advisory notes that the Pen/Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127, criminalizes the “use” or “installation” of a “device” or “process” that “records,” “decodes,” or “captures” non-content dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling (“DRAS”) information. DRAS information is non-content information used to transmit or process communications; depending on the system, this could include device serial numbers, cell site information, media access control (MAC) addresses, the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI), or the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI). Use or installation of a pen register or trap and trace device is prohibited, unless conducted pursuant to a court order or when a statutory exception applies. With respect to the Pen/Trap Statute, the exceptions state that they are limited only to providers of wire or electronic communication services. While the term “non-content” is not defined, content is defined as “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). Importantly, machine-to-machine communications and data transfers between devices can be considered “content.

The Wiretap Act (also known as Title III), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., prohibits, among other things, “intentionally intercept[ing]” the content of “any . . . electronic communication[,]” unless it is conducted pursuant to a court order or a statutory exception applies. An “electronic communication” is defined, with certain exceptions, as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. § 2510(12).

Problems Raised by the Pen/Trap Statute and the Wiretap Act

The proscriptions created by the Pen/Trap Statute and the Wiretap Act described above are problematic for counter-UAS solutions because they act as barriers to what might be the simplest method of drone detection and mitigation of the rogue UAS.  

Background: Mitigation

As the term is used with reference to UAS, “mitigation” means preventing the operation of  the rogue UAS.  The August 2020 Advisory provides that:

Mitigation capabilities fall into two general categories: non-kinetic and kinetic. Non-kinetic solutions use non-physical measures to disrupt or disable UAS, including RF, WiFi, or Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming; spoofing; hacking techniques; and non-destructive directed energy weapons. Kinetic solutions may employ a variety of measures capable of physically disrupting or disabling a UAS, including nets, projectiles, and lasers. The use of non-kinetic or kinetic solutions may implicate federal criminal prohibitions against, among other things, intercepting and interfering with communications, damaging a “protected computer,” and damaging an “aircraft.” … Jamming technologies are designed to block or interfere with authorized radio communications. Examples of jamming include transmitting RF signals from a jammer at a higher “signal strength” than the RF signals being used to navigate or control the aircraft; preventing a cellular, WiFi, or Bluetooth-enabled device from connecting to a network (such as a cellular system or the Internet); or preventing a GPS unit from receiving positioning signals from a satellite. Spoofing technologies can replicate and replace or modify signals, and can lead to loss of control over the UAS’s navigation and communications link (e.g., its link to its ground controller). Hacking techniques generally focus on the UAS’s communications link and/or the onboard computer processors… Jamming, spoofing, and hacking technologies should be evaluated under the federal criminal statutes below (including the aircraft sabotage and aircraft piracy provisions), in addition to the laws discussed above with regard to detection.

So, the Pen/Trap Statute and the Wiretap Act as currently interpreted bar the interception of the controlling signal from the pilot in command on the ground to the drone in flight. Applying the law of unintended consequences to statutes designed to intercept analog telephone calls, it would seem that the literal application of the Pen/Trap Statute and the Wiretap Act contained in the August 2020 Advisory to the interception of wireless communications between potentially dangerous drones and their pilots is misguided. Hence, the EO’s call for the Pen/Trap Statute and the Wiretap Act to be revised “to reflect relevant developments in Federal law and regulations addressing drones” carries merit.

RESTORING AMERICAN AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY - EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED JUNE 6, 2025 - HIGHLIGHTS, PART TWO

The Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty Executive Order was issued by President Trump on June 6, 2025. See here. The purpose of the Executive Order (EO) was to address the perceived threat offered by Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (“UAS” or “drones”) to potentially endanger public safety through unauthorized drone flights and to ensure American sovereignty over its skies and that its airspace remains safe and secure.

The following is Part Two of a summary of provisions of particular interest with respect to drone law in the EO.

Section 3 of the EO, entitled “Policy”, provides that:

It is the policy of the United States to ensure control over our national airspace and to protect the public, critical infrastructure, mass gathering events, and military and sensitive government installations and operations from threats posed by the careless or unlawful use of UAS.   It is the policy of the United States to ensure control over our national airspace and to protect the public, critical infrastructure, mass gathering events, and military and sensitive government installations and operations from threats posed by the careless or unlawful use of UAS.

One measure of the need to protect the public is evidenced by the FAA data concerning drone incursions of the airspace near airports. The FAA website, Drone Sightings Near Airports, at https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_records/uas_sightings_report, has tracked drone sightings near airports since October, 2019. Since that time, the FAA has documented thousands of drone sightings near airports.  The FAA reports 1,028 drone sightings near airports in the first half of 2025 alone.

The EO also addresses the protection of critical infrastructures. The EO states that “…the term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e), and includes systems and assets in all of the designated critical infrastructure sectors identified in National Security Memorandum 22 of April 30, 2024 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience) (NSM-22)…” (NSM-22 is found at https://www.cisa.gov/national-security-memorandum-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience).

To facilitate the protection of critical infrastructures, Section 5 of the EO requires the FAA to establish Airspace Regulations to Protect the Public.  Section 5 provides:

The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shall:

(a)  with respect to the rulemaking required by section 2209(f) of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, as amended:

(i)   promptly submit a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Task Force establishing the statutorily required process for restricting drone flights over fixed site facilities, and interpreting, to the extent appropriate, critical infrastructure consistent with the definition of that term in this order; and

(ii)  promulgate a final rule as soon as practicable after publication of the NPRM;

Section 2209 has a long history, as one might surmise from the reference above to the federal legislation enacted in 2016.

Background Of Section 2209

On July 15, 2016, Congress enacted Public Law 114-190, entitled the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016 (FESSA). The legislation included Section 2209, entitled “Applications for Designation”, which directed the Secretary of Transportation to “establish a process to allow applicants to petition the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to prohibit or restrict the operation of an unmanned aircraft in close proximity to a fixed site facility.” Within Section 2209, Congress directed that an eligible facility must be a fixed site facility within one or more defined industry sectors: “critical infrastructure, such as energy production, transmission, and distribution facilities and equipment;  ; amusement parks; [and] other locations that warrant such restrictions.”

On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted Public Law 115–254, also known as the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (FAARA 2018). FAARA 2018 amended part A of subtitle VII of title 49, United States Code by inserting a new chapter 448, entitled Unmanned Aircraft Systems, which incorporated additional authorities and mandated the FAA to support the further integration of UAS into the airspace of the United States. One of those provisions amended Section 2209 of FESSA to add rail facilities as an additional fixed site facility sector to be protected.

On May 16, 2024, Congress enacted Public Law 118-63, entitled FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (FAARA 2024). FAARA 2024 reauthorized the FAA through FY2028, including activities and programs related to airport planning and development, facilities and equipment, and operations. With respect to fixed site facilities, Section 929 of FAARA 2024 amended Section 2209 to add state prisons as an additional fixed site facility sector to those designated previously. FAARA 2024 added the following definition to section 2209:

‘‘(g) DEFINITION OF STATE PRISON.—In this section, the term ‘State prison’ means an institution under State jurisdiction, including a State Department of Corrections, the primary use of which is for the confinement of individuals convicted of a felony.’’

In light of the foregoing inaction of FAA compliance with prior specific Congressional mandates, the text in Section 5 requiring the FAA to implement Section 2209 with all due haste is entirely understandable if not long overdue.

RESTORING AMERICAN AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY - EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED JUNE 6, 2025 - HIGHLIGHTS, PART ONE

The Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty Executive Order was issued by President Trump on June 6, 2025. See here. The purpose of the Executive Order (EO) was to address the perceived threat offered by Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (“UAS” or “drones”) to potentially endanger public safety through unauthorized drone flights and to ensure American sovereignty over its skies. The purpose of the EO was also to ensure that America’s airspace remains safe and secure.

The following is Part One of a summary of provisions of greatest interest with respect to drone law in the EO.

1.      1. Ensure American sovereignty:

Section 1 of the EO, entitled “Purpose” provides that:

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), otherwise known as drones, offer the potential to enhance public safety as well as cement America’s leadership in global innovation.  But criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign actors have intensified their weaponization of these technologies, creating new and serious threats to our homeland.  Drug cartels use UAS to smuggle fentanyl across our borders, deliver contraband into prisons, surveil law enforcement, and otherwise endanger the public.  Mass gatherings are vulnerable to disruptions and threats by unauthorized UAS flights.  Critical infrastructure, including military bases, is subject to frequent — and often unidentified — UAS incursions.  Immediate action is needed to ensure American sovereignty over its skies and that its airspace remains safe and secure.

With respect to the use of the term “sovereignty” as emphasized in the EO, normally this term is used in the context of supreme authority. According to  the Oxford English Dictionary, “sovereignty is the supreme authority within a state, encompassing the power to govern and the ability to impose laws on everyone else within its territory. It essentially means a state's right to exercise supreme authority within its borders.”

Federal law specifically confers on the FAA the legal authority to control the National Airspace System (NAS). The FAA’s general statutory authority is found in the United States Code, Title 49, 49 U.S.C. §§40101- 50105. Specifically, the United States Government has exclusive sovereignty over airspace of the United States pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103. The airspace, therefore, is not subject to private ownership nor can the flight of an aircraft within the navigable airspace of the United States constitute a trespass.

Unmanned aircraft are aircraft consistent with Subtitle B of Public Law 112-95 and the existing definition of aircraft in Title 49 of the United States Code, 49 U.S.C. 40102.

The United States Congress has vested the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with authority to regulate the areas of airspace use, management and efficiency, air traffic control, safety, navigational facilities, and aircraft noise at its source. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, and 44701-44735. Congress has directed the FAA to “develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.” 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1). Congress has further directed the FAA to “prescribe air traffic regulations on the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes)” for navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft; protecting individuals and property on the ground; using the navigable airspace efficiently; and preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects." 49 U.S.C.§ 40103(b)(2).

Pursuant to the foregoing, the FAA has the legal authority to control the NAS, and the FAA has not ceded this legal control. So, while the spirit of the EO is well taken, there technically is no need to “restore” the FAA’s “supreme authority” over the NAS at this point in time.

Integration of Powered-Lift: Pilot Certification and Operations; Miscellaneous Amendments Related to Rotorcraft and Airplanes

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Washington DC has promulgated a final rule published in the Federal Register on Thursday, November 21, 2024, 89 FR 92296, entitled Integration of Powered-Lift: Pilot Certification and Operations; Miscellaneous Amendments Related to Rotorcraft and Airplanes.

To safely integrate powered-lift in the national airspace system (NAS), the FAA in this landmark final rule is making permanent changes to parts 61, 135, and 142. These changes are intended to   ease the training and certification requirements of powered-lift pilots and instructors. The FAA is also issuing a temporary Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) for a period of ten years that supplements existing rules, creates temporary alternatives for airman certification, removes operational barriers, finalizes other amendments which are necessary to integrate powered-lift into the National Airspace System (NAS) and mitigates safety risks for powered-lift.  (Powered-lift is defined in 14 CFR § 1.1 as a heavier-than-air aircraft capable of vertical takeoff, vertical landing, and low speed flight that depends principally on engine-driven lift  devices or engine thrust for lift during these flight regimes and on nonrotating airfoil(s)  for lift during horizontal flight.)

In this final action, the FAA stated that it did not establish any new requirements for the type certification of powered-lift, nor did it revise existing type certification requirements. The FAA noted that existing aircraft certification requirements are sufficient to type certificate powered-lift as a special class under § 21.17(b). However, the FAA did adopt new requirements for pilots to allow them to hold type ratings for each powered-lift they fly. The FAA also adopted new qualification requirements for powered-lift pilots serving in part 135 operations.

To address the perceived gaps in the airman certification process, the FAA final action provides alternatives to certain requirements in part 61 through the establishment of a new part 194, Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 120—Powered-Lift: Pilot Certification and Training; Operations Requirements. This new section will facilitate the training and certification of the initial cadre of powered-lift instructors and pilots. In addition to this alternate framework, the FAA adopted several pathways to certificate powered-lift pilots utilizing aircraft with a single flight control and single pilot station. The FAA is facilitating this process through three options: (1) recognition of a single flight control that is accessible by both the student and flight instructor and allows for the instructor to immediately intervene if necessary; (2) expanded use of simulators to allow an applicant to train in a simulator and gain necessary experience solo in the aircraft; and (3) deviation authority for consideration of future advancements in technology that is not currently validated at this time. These changes significantly expanded the ability to use flight simulator technology as part of pilot training and qualification programs. The SFAR also incorporates several very workable options for training pilots in powered-lift using a single set of controls.

The full text of the final rule can be found here:

DHS, FBI, FAA & DoD Joint Statement on Ongoing Response to Reported Drone Sightings

In response to the recent publicity and confusion concern numerous reports of drone sightings in the northeastern United States, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense issued a  Joint Statement on Ongoing Response to Reported Drone Sightings, as follows:

Tuesday, December 17, 2024

There are more than one million drones lawfully registered with the FAA in the United States and there are thousands of commercial, hobbyist and law enforcement drones lawfully in the sky on any given day. With the technology landscape evolving, we expect that number to increase over time.

FBI has received tips of more than 5,000 reported drone sightings in the last few weeks with approximately 100 leads generated, and the federal government is supporting state and local officials in investigating these reports. Consistent with each of our unique missions and authorities, we are quickly working to prioritize and follow these leads. We have sent advanced detection technology to the region. And we have sent trained visual observers.

Having closely examined the technical data and tips from concerned citizens, we assess that the sightings to date include a combination of lawful commercial drones, hobbyist drones, and law enforcement drones, as well as manned fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and stars mistakenly reported as drones. We have not identified anything anomalous and do not assess the activity to date to present a national security or public safety risk over the civilian airspace in New Jersey or other states in the northeast.

That said, we recognize the concern among many communities. We continue to support state and local authorities with advanced detection technology and support of law enforcement. We urge Congress to enact counter-UAS legislation when it reconvenes that would extend and expand existing counter-drone authorities to identify and mitigate any threat that may emerge. 

Additionally, there have been a limited number of visual sightings of drones over military facilities in New Jersey and elsewhere, including within restricted air space. Such sightings near or over DoD installations are not new. DoD takes unauthorized access over its airspace seriously and coordinates closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, as appropriate. Local commanders are actively engaged to ensure there are appropriate detection and mitigation measures in place.

For more information, visit https://www.faa.gov/newsroom.

FAA Seeks Comment on Draft Advisory Circular for the Type Certification of Powered-Lift

On Monday, June 10, 2024, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  in Washington, D.C., issued a statement concerning the certification of  electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft. The statement  noted that the FAA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) had achieved a significant milestone on the path to certifying electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft. The FAA stated that this measure also marked important progress in the agency’s effort to more closely align rulemaking and policy initiatives between the United States and the European Union. The FAA restated its commitment to ensuring the safety of the flying public both at home and abroad.

In furtherance of this milestone, the FAA issued a Draft Advisory Circular for the Type Certification of Powered-Lift (Draft AC) on June 12, 2024. Public comment on the Draft AC addressing the type, production, and airworthiness certification of powered-lift are requested. Comments must be received on or before August 12, 2024. Comments can be uploaded to Regulations.gov in Docket No. FAA-2024-1586. Commenters should include the subject line “Type Certification – Powered-lift” and the docket number FAA 2024-1586 on all comments submitted to the FAA. A comment matrix has been provided by the FAA for use of comment submission at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/ac.

Powered-lift is defined in 14 CFR § 1.1 as a heavier-than-air aircraft capable of vertical takeoff, vertical landing, and low speed flight that depends principally on engine-driven lift  devices or engine thrust for lift during these flight regimes and on nonrotating airfoil(s)  for lift during horizontal flight. The Draft AC points out that powered-lift have characteristics of both an airplane and a rotorcraft, providing the capability to function as a rotorcraft for takeoff and landing  and as an airplane during cruise flight. This combination of lift capabilities creates the  potential for increased speeds and duration, compared to rotorcraft, during the enroute portion of the flight.

The FAA notes that the Draft  AC provides guidance for the type, production, and airworthiness certification of powered-lift. The FAA states that the Draft AC consequently  establishes a more efficient path in designating the type certification basis for certain powered-lift projects, as the FAA will not need to announce the criteria for each project in the Federal Register for notice and comment for those designs that use the criteria in this AC with no additions or changes.

For the text of the Draft AC see https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/ac.